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CAN A MACHINE DESIGN?
NIGEL CROSS
Department of Design and Innovation
Faculty of Technology, The Open University
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA,   UK
Abstract: One strand of my research has been concerned with the computer as a design
tool; but a second strand has been concerned with design computing as a research tool for
improving our understanding of the design process. Some of this latter research is based
on the simulation of computer behavior by human beings - a reversal of the more usual
approach - and some is based on comparisons of computational models with human
design behavior. Despite recent doubts expressed by some authors, I suggest that the
question, ‘Can a machine design?’ is still a useful question to ask.
Introduction
Asking ‘Can a machine design?’ is similar to asking ‘Can a machine think?’
The answer to the latter question seems to be, ‘It all depends on what you mean
by “think”.’ Alan Turing (1950) attempted to resolve the question by his
‘Turing Test’ for artificial intelligence - if you could not distinguish, in a blind
test, between answers to your questions provided by either a human being or a
machine, then the machine could be said to be exhibiting intelligent behavior,
i.e. ‘thinking’.
In some of my research related to computers in design, I have used
something like the Turing Test in reverse - getting human beings to respond t o
design tasks as though they were machines. There have been various intentions
behind this strategy. One intention has been to simulate computer systems that
do not yet exist; another has been to try to shed light on what it is that human
designers do, by interpreting their behavior as though they were computers. My
assumption throughout has been that asking ‘Can a machine design?’ is an
appropriate research strategy, not simply for trying to replace human design by
machine design, but for better understanding the cognitive processes of human
design activity. However, this assumption has been challenged recently. In this
paper I will first review some of my research, and then return to this challenge.
Using humans to simulate computers
My first research project began when I completed my undergraduate course in
architecture in the mid-sixties and went on to study in the new field of design
research, at the Design Research Laboratory at UMIST, Manchester, run by
John Christopher Jones. My MSc research project was in ‘Simulation of
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Computer Aided Design’ (Cross, 1967) - a novel but strange idea that we might
get some insights into what CAD might be like, and what the design
requirements for CAD systems might be, by attempting to simulate the use of
CAD facilities which at that time were mostly hypotheses and suggestions for
future systems that hardly anyone really knew how to begin to develop. The
strangeness about this idea was that we would effect these simulations through
getting human beings to pretend to be the computers! This was the reverse
application of the ‘Turing Test’.
The project was based on getting designers (architects) to attempt a small
design project in experimental conditions (like the protocol studies and similar
studies that have grown up since that time). They were given the design brief,
and asked to produce a sketch concept. As well as conventional drawing
materials, they had a simulated computer system to help them: they could write
questions on cards located in front of a closed-circuit TV camera, and would
receive answers on a TV screen in front of them. In another room, at the other
end of the CCTV link, was a small team of architects and building engineers who
attempted to answer the designer’s questions. Thus we had a very crude
simulation of some features of what might actually now be parts of a modern-
day CAD system, such as expert systems and databases.
The designers who participated in these experiments were not told what to
expect from the ‘computer’, nor given any constraints on the kinds of facilities
they might choose to ask of it. Thus I hoped to discover what kinds of facilities
and features might be required of future CAD systems, and gain some insights
into the ‘systemic behavioral patterns’ that might emerge in these future
human-computer systems.
I conducted ten such experiments, each of which lasted about one hour. The
messages between designer and ‘computer’ were recorded, and one of the
analyses made was to classify them into the topics to which they referred, from
the client’s brief to construction details. This kind of data gave some insight
into the designers’ patterns of activity, such as a cyclical pattern of topics over
time, from requirements to details and back again. The number of messages sent
in each experiment was quite low, with normally several minutes elapsing
between requests from the designer. Of course, the response time from the
‘computer’ could also be quite long, typically of the order of 30 seconds.
Despite this apparently easy pace of interaction, all the designers reported that
they found the experiments hard work and stressful. They reported the main
benefit of using the ‘computer’ as being an increased speed of work, principally
by reducing uncertainty (i.e. they relatively quickly received answers to queries,
which they accepted as reliable information).
I also tried a few variations from my standard experiments. The most
interesting was to reverse the normal set of expectations of the functions of
the designer and the ‘computer’. The ‘computer’ was given the job of having t o
produce a design, to the satisfaction of the observing designer. It was
immediately apparent that in this situation there was no stress on the designer -
in fact, it became quite fun - and it was the ‘computer’ that found the
experience to be hard work. This led me to suggest that CAD system designers
should aim for
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‘a much more active role for the computer, tantamount to a virtual inversion of the present
designer/computer roles. The computer should be asking questions of the designer, seeking
from him those decisions which it is not competent to handle itself. The computer could be
doing all the drawing work, with the designer instructing amendments. Drawings presented by
the computer on a graphic interface would be gradually completed as the designer made more
decisions . . . Programmed to proceed as far as possible without human intervention at each step,
the computer would ask for decisions as required . . . We should be moving towards giving the
machine a sufficient degree of intelligent behavior, and a corresponding increase in
participation in the design process, to liberate the designer from routine procedures and to
enhance his decision-making role.’ (Cross, 1967)
This vision of the intelligent computer was based on an assumption that a
machine can design - that it can be programmed to do a lot of the design work,
but under the supervision of a human designer. I still think that there is
something relevant in this vision of the computer as designer - it still offers a
more satisfactory basis for the human-machine relationship in computer aided
design than current CAD systems. Why isn’t using a CAD system a more
enjoyable, and perhaps also a more intellectually demanding experience than it
has turned out to be?
Comparing human and machine performances
I continued research on this question of human and machine roles in computer
aided design for my PhD (Cross, 1974). My earlier studies had suggested that
using computers in design might have adverse effects, such as inducing stress,
whilst not having any beneficial effects on the quality of the resulting designs.
The only ‘positive’ effect that CAD appeared to have was to speed up the
design process. The potential negative effects of CAD that I identified were an
intensification of the designer’s work rate and a concomitant reduction in the
person-power required in design offices. But on the other hand I suggested that
CAD in architecture might lead to better communication between members of
the design team, and to the inclusion of a wider range of participants, such as
the new building’s users. (Cross, 1972.)
However, I still seemed to have a belief that a machine can design - that it
can produce designs that are somehow better - more efficient, or more elegant,
or something - than designs produced by humans. Drawing on research in
problem solving (of the ‘travelling salesman’ route-layout type) at the
pioneering artificial intelligence centre at Edinburgh University, I expected that
human-machine interaction (rather than wholly-human or wholly-machine
problem solving) would efficiently produce design solutions that were better
than either a human or a machine could produce alone.
So I set out to test that hypothesis, using the problem of efficient room
layouts in a building plan. (There had been some early attempts at producing
‘optimum’ room-plan layouts. The idea was that if you had some data for the
numbers of journeys that typically would be made by the future building’s users
between the different elements of accommodation, then you could get a
computer to optimise the layout so as to minimise the ‘circulation cost’ - i.e.
the number of journeys multiplied by the lengths of journeys. Rooms that would
have a high number of journeys between them would be placed close together,
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and so on.) I devised experiments in which fully-automatic computer programs,
un-aided humans and human designers aided by interactive layout programs
tackled the same layout problems.
I fully expected to replicate the Edinburgh results, and was genuinely
surprised to find that (a) there were no significant differences between the
performances (i.e. the efficiency of the layouts) of un-aided humans and
automatic computer programs, and (b) human-machine interaction produced
worse results than either un-aided humans or automatic machines! There were
some strong mitigating circumstances arising from the crude nature of the
human-machine interaction that was possible at that time (teletype terminals
and storage-tube displays!), but nevertheless it was a surprising result, that
shook my confidence in CAD developments at that time, and led me to the
conclusion that machines cannot design very well at all, and actually make
design results worse, rather than better. In writing up my thesis for publication
in book form (Cross, 1977a), I concluded that CAD would be of very limited
positive effectiveness as a design aid, but could have profound negative effects
on design activity and the job of being a designer. In an article in the RIBA
Journal, I confessed that ‘I have seen the future; and it doesn’t work!’ (Cross,
1977b.)
Eliciting computable rules from human behavior
It was a long time before I returned to similar kinds of research. The
developments in computing and CAD in the 1980s made me realise that, for
good or bad, using computers in design practice was inevitable (indeed was
already ubiquitous).
A project I was involved with in the mid-1990s was based on a sub-question
of ‘Can a machine design?’ It was ‘Can a machine make aesthetic judgements?’
The aesthetic aspects of design are often assumed (by designers, if not by some
of the CAD researchers) to be some of the most intractable aspects for
computers to attempt. But my colleagues and I thought that there might be
some implicit rule-based behavior in aesthetic judgements, which might be
modelled in a computer system.
The design domain we were working in was that of graphic design, where
designers normally guard their aesthetic freedom very jealously. We agreed with
them that it might not be possible to construct rules of aesthetically ‘good’
design, but we thought that it might be possible to establish rules of ‘bad’ design.
If so, then a rule-based expert system could be used to evaluate graphic designs,
pointing out the ‘bad’ features. Users of such a system, even if they could not
produce ‘good’ designs, might at least be able to produce designs that were ‘not
bad’. We had in mind users of wordprocessors and simple desktop publishing
systems, producing amateur graphic designs such as in-house notices,
newsletters, etc.
We collected examples of such amateur designs (A4 ‘posters’) from around
our own University Department noticeboards, and submitted them to critiques
by two expert graphic designers. We then converted the experts’ comments on
the ‘bad’ design features into rules, and tested these rules by using ourselves as
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‘human computers’ - strictly following the instructions in a machine-like way,
until ambiguity was eliminated. (In a way, this was also following Turing’s early
theoretical argument that problem-solving programs might in principle run on
any kind of ‘machine’ - thus separating the program from the computer.) Then
we applied the rules to a new sample of posters and compared the ‘machine’
results with those of the human experts’ critiques of the new posters.
We found that a relatively small number of rules (less than twenty) could be
used to eliminate common ‘bad’ design features. Some of our rules were very
simple, such as ‘Left and right margins should be equal’, or ‘If more than 70%
of text is centred, then all text should be centred.’ But applying such simple
rules does lead to designs that are ‘not bad’. We also found that the human
experts were frustratingly inconsistent in applying their own ‘rules’; when we
pointed this out to them, they were quite happy to accept that the rules were
indeed valid, but need not always be applied rigourously in every case! This
seems to be something like allowing the judge some leniency in passing
sentence. This work is reported in Glaze et al. (1996).
This was not a demonstration that a machine can design. It was a
demonstration that, in principle, a machine can do some things that many
human beings regard as a uniquely human attribute - in this case, making
aesthetic judgements. To me it was also a confirmation of the value of asking
‘Can a machine design?’ as a research strategy for investigating design. We had
learned something about a relatively difficult area of design activity, and also
something about designers and their ways of thinking.
Natural versus artificial intelligence
We might not necessarily want machines to do everything that human beings
do, but setting challenges for machines to do some of the cognitively hard
things that people do should give us insight into those things and into the
broader nature of human cognitive abilities. I had always assumed that this
argument was one of the validations for research in artificial intelligence. Thus
we would learn more about ourselves. For example, the research programme in
computer chess playing has presumably not had the ultimate aim of making it
unnecessary for humans ever to ‘need’ to play chess again. Rather, it has been
to gain understanding of the nature of the ‘problem’ of the chess game itself,
and of the nature of the human cognitive processes which are brought to bear in
chess playing and in the resolution of chess problems.
That has always been my assumption about the value of trying to get
machines to do things that human beings do, whether that is playing chess or
designing. But John Casti, of the Santa Fe Institute, came to a rather disturbing
conclusion about the lessons that may have been learned from chess-playing
machines. In his book, The Cambridge Quintet, Casti (1998) imagines a debate
on computation and artificial intelligence between Turing, Wittgenstein,
Schrödinger, and Haldane, chaired by C. P. Snow. In a postscript, Casti refers t o
the 1997 defeat of the world chess champion, Garry Kasparov, by the computer
program Deep Blue II, and he quotes Kasparov as saying, ‘I sensed an alien
intelligence in the program.’
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Casti then goes on to come to the rather surprising, and depressing
conclusion that ‘we have learned almost nothing about human cognitive
capabilities and methods from the construction of chess-playing programs’. So,
in computer-design research, will we be forced to come to the same conclusion,
that ‘we have learned almost nothing about human cognitive capabilities and
methods from the construction of designing programs’? Will designers rather
nervously contemplate the ‘alien intelligence’ of the designing programs? Will
we have built machines that can design, but also have to bring ourselves t o
Casti’s view of the ‘success’ of chess-playing machines: ‘the operation was a
success - but the patient died!’?
Perhaps Casti is being unduly pessimistic. One thing that we have learned
from chess-playing programs is that the brute force of computation actually
can achieve performances that outmatch human performance in a significant
area of human cognitive endeavour. And surely researchers of computer chess-
playing have learned something of the cognitive strategies of human chess
players, even though their programs do not ‘think’ like humans? Certainly I
believe that, on a much smaller scale, our research on aesthetic judgements in
design had that kind of value.
In more recent research I have also found that computational models of
design activity can be useful descriptive or explanatory models of human design
behavior. This has been particularly so in the field of creative design, where
attempts to build computational models have provided some useful paradigms
for the nature of creative design activity (Cross, 1997, 1998). I think that
many of the attributes of design cognition that we now regard as essential
features of the natural intelligence of design (Cross, 1999) have been identified
as a result of attempts to simulate design activity in artificial intelligence.
It seems to me that research in artificial intelligence should always address
the question, ‘What are we learning from this research about how people
think?’ Similarly, our computer-design research should attempt to tell us
something about how designers think. I believe we can learn some important
things about the nature of human design cognition through looking at design
from the computational perspective (although ‘the computationalist paradigm
in design research’ has also been challenged by Liddament, 1999). For me, the
value of asking the question ‘Can a machine design?’ is that it begs the
corollary question, ‘How do people design?’
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